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Education’s role in determining worker incomes in China’s rapidly changing urban 
labor markets is investigated in this paper. Using worker data from a 1999-2000 urban 
enterprise survey, we examine the effects of education on the current earnings of 
continuously-employed urban workers, migrants, and laid off but subsequently re-
employed workers, as well as on the most recent earnings of laid-off (but not 
subsequently re-employed) workers. We also decompose the earnings differentials 
between each of these groups of workers and then assess the contribution of education to 
explanations of the differentials.  
The empirical results demonstrate that educational attainment remains an important 
explanator of earnings differentials between institutionally-differentiated groups of 
workers in China’s urban labor markets. An interesting hierarchy of returns to education 
has developed. The education of migrants is generally poorly rewarded. The moderate 
returns to educational investments of the continuously-employed urban residents rank 
next. Re-employed urban residents experience the highest rewards to their education, 
especially those who used a competitive means to find their post-layoff employment. 
When we assess the earning differentials between groups using the continuously-
employed urban residents as the basis of comparison, differences in educational 
attainments alone contribute between 16 and 52 percent of the explanation of the total 
inter-group wage gaps. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Differential Rewards to, and Contributions of, Education in Urban 
China’s Segmented Labor Markets 
Introduction: 
This paper studies the role of education in determining worker incomes in China’s 
rapidly changing urban labor markets. Using worker data from a 1999-2000 urban 
enterprise survey, we examine the effects of education on the current earnings of 
continuously-employed urban workers, migrants, and laid off but subsequently re-
employed workers, as well as on the most recent earnings of laid-off (but not 
subsequently re-employed) workers. We also decompose the earnings differentials 
between each of these groups of workers and then assess the contribution of education to 
explanations of the differentials.  
The empirical results demonstrate, not surprisingly, that the human capital of urban 
residents is better rewarded than that of migrant workers. Furthermore, the human capital 
accumulation of workers who have suffered a layoff but managed to find new 
employment is rewarded more, in terms of incremental earnings for each additional year 
of schooling, than that of continuously-employed urban workers. Interestingly, re-
employed workers’ education is better rewarded in these workers’ post-layoff jobs than it 
was in their pre-layoff jobs.  
When we assess the earning differentials between groups using the continuously-
employed urban residents as the basis of comparison we can explain, in terms of 
differences in productive characteristics, 75 percent of the earnings gap for migrants, 40 
percent of the gap for laid-off workers, and –8 percent of the earnings gap for re-
employed workers. Differences in educational attainments alone contribute between 16 
and 52 percent of the explanation of the total wage gaps between groups. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Background: 
Changes to China’s agricultural production system in the late 1970s and early 
1980s created irresistible pressure for change in labor mobility. The subsequent loosening 
of migration restrictions in the mid-1980s allowed large numbers of rural residents to 
look for work in urban areas. Rural-to-urban migration snowballed—by 1996 45 million 
migrants were seeking work in cities (Rural Development Institute, 1998).  
As Roberts describes: 
The migrants have transformed the cities of China. They build 
skyscrapers, sell vegetables, clothes, and a variety of other commodities in 
markets that previously did not exist, prepare and serve food sold in 
sidewalk stands and fine restaurants, fix bicycles and plumbing, and do the 
hard and dirty work in factories, transport, and sanitation. (2001, p.16) 
 
The state’s household registration (hukou) system classifies individuals according 
to residence and economic status. Each person’s hukou records their place of presumed 
regular residence (suozaidi), that is, the place they belong to, as well as their status 
(leibie)—agricultural or non-agricultural. The latter classification is more typically 
referred to as rural or urban and itself determines an individual’s eligibility for state 
provided services, benefits, and jobs. (Chan and Zhang 1999, Fan 1999). Migrants 
working in urban areas are typically both away from their registered place of residence 
and classified as agricultural workers. 
The agricultural/non-agricultural classification was originally based on 
occupation but currently bears little relationship to occupation: tens of millions of 
individuals working in off-farm jobs are classified as agricultural. The hukou system 
divides Chinese society into two groups—privileged state-supported urban (non-
agricultural) elites and underprivileged self-reliant rural (agricultural) residents. (Chan 
and Zhang 1999, Fan 1999). Hukou registration is not a matter of choice—accidents of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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birth rather than personal preferences determine one’s hukou status and hukou status 
greatly influences one’s economic opportunities.  
Recent empirical work investigating the extent of labor market segmentation and 
discrimination in China’s urban labor markets has focused, appropriately, on the 
rural/urban dichotomy. In a Shanghai-based sample of urban residents and migrants, 
Meng and Zhang (2001) find that 22 percent of urban residents are in occupations above 
that warranted by their productive characteristics while 6 percent of migrants are in jobs 
below that warranted by their qualifications. They also find, once the occupational 
distribution is taken into account, that the entire pay gap between these two groups is left 
unexplained--presumably due to unfair treatment. Meng’s (2002) exploration of the 
source of discrimination against migrant workers employed in urban industrial enterprises 
suggests that urban residents are the “insiders” in profit-sharing firms while migrants are 
“outsiders” with no claims to enterprise profits. Knight , Song, and Jia, (1999) employing 
a similar enterprise-based survey of employed migrants, report the marginal product of 
migrants exceeds their wages by a factor of more than three while, in contrast, the wages 
of urban residents exceed their marginal product. They also report that managers view 
migrants as desirable, hard-working, and flexible employees and would hire more of 
them if not constrained from doing so by government policies. Fan finds resident status a 
central factor in explaining labor market segmentation (2002) and reports that resident 
status functions like an ascribed attribute, rather than achieved attributes, in determining 
labor market outcomes (2001).  
The state’s concerns about open unemployment and social instability in urban 
areas initially caused the Chinese leadership to take a slow, cautious approach in its William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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transition to a market economy. Consequently, the demands for more flexible and 
efficient labor markets brought by a new generation of profit-motivated managers were at 
first resisted, experimented with, and introduced only gradually. By the mid-1990s, 
however, concerns about state-sector inefficiency began to override concerns about 
dismissals and layoffs. This led to the policy of putting workers on xiagang, a form of 
layoff in which workers were placed on inactive status and sent home with small 
stipends.  The policy was applied nation-wide in 1997. Massive layoffs of urban workers 
resulted: by the end of the year, between 11 and 15 million were put on xiagang.
1  Over 
25 million workers were laid-off (put on xiagang) in the first three years of the policy.  
9.4 million workers remained in the ranks of the laid-off  as of year’s end 1999 
(Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian,2000). 
  Enterprise restructuring has forced urban workers to bear much of the cost of a 
painful adjustment process as enterprises shed redundant workers. Workers are no longer 
shielded from market forces. Laid-off workers experience substantial periods of 
unemployment with minimal stipends (Appleton et. al., 2002). Income inequality is 
widening. In the early reform period, increases in income inequality meant that those at 
the low end of the income distribution lost out relative to those at the high end of the 
distribution despite experiencing rising incomes. In the current period of extensive 
layoffs those at the low end of the distribution are experiencing substantial reductions in 
their income (Meng 2001). 
                                                 
1 Li (1997) reports State Statistical Bureau estimates of 15 million redundant employees. Li (1998) also 
quotes the former Minister of Labor, Li Boyong, as reporting 11.51 million lay-offs in 1997, of which 7.87 
million were from state-owned enterprises. 
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The plight of these displaced urban workers is compounded by competition from 
rural migrants seeking work. Although migrants are reported to do the work that urban 
residents disdain—the jobs that are dangerous, demanding, and dirty, the stage is clearly 
set for a conflict of interest between migrants and urban residents. As will be shown 
below, a number of urban enterprises both lay off urban workers and employ migrants in 
production line positions. 
  The implementation of xiagang policies has changed the landscape of urban labor 
markets. Labor market participants can no longer just be analyzed simply according to 
hukou status as either protected, elite urban residents or migrants. Laid-off urban 
residents are now a prominent feature of the urban terrain and must be taken into 
consideration in labor market analyses. Education is a key determinant of both the lay-off 
and re-employment processes (Maurer-Fazio, forthcoming). In many urban enterprises 
particular urban residents are selected for layoff while others keep their jobs. The 
consequences being laid-off vary: some of the laid-off workers find new employment 
quickly while others suffer extended spells of unemployment.  
In one sense this paper can be viewed as simply reporting both the returns to 
education and the contribution of education to explaining wage differentials for a rich 
array of market participants: continuously-employed urban residents, migrant workers, 
laid-off workers, and laid off but re-employed workers. In another sense, by examining 
differences in the returns to education between these groups this paper explores the 
degree of integration, or lack thereof, in China’s urban labor markets in1999 and 2000, a 
period in which workers faced both a great deal of uncertainty and a rapidly changing 
work environment, a period in which the potential for greater competition and conflict William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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between laid-off workers and migrants has arisen. We seek answers to a series of related 
questions: How do the productive characteristics of migrants compare to those of the 
redundant workers and of employed urban residents? How are redundant workers faring 
in the transition? How does the labor market treatment of migrants compare to that of 
urban residents whether continuously employed or laid off? 
The Data 
  The data were gathered in the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000 as part of the Urban 
Labor Market Integration Project.
2 The data set is enterprise based and ties together 
enterprise information with that of workers of three different categories: employed urban 
residents, laid-off urban residents, and employed migrants. Surveys were conducted at 
118 enterprises, roughly 20 in each of six cities: Beijing, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xian, Tianjin, 
and Changchun. 
Industry type (hangye) was the primary selection criteria for inclusion of an enterprise 
in the survey process. In each city several textile, mechanical processing, and 
construction firms were selected. The remaining enterprises were chosen according to the 
industrial mix of each city. Secondary selection criteria dictated that, within an industry, 
enterprises be selected to provide firms differing in scale, economic prosperity, and 
ownership. Firms known to have laid-off workers or to have both laid-off workers and 
hired migrants were deliberately over sampled. At the time of the survey, 83 of the 
sample’s 118 enterprises had a number of laid off workers on their rolls. Approximately 
                                                 
2 The Urban Labor Market Integration Project was funded by the Ford Foundation, Beijing Office and was 
carried out by principle investigators: Fang Cai (Population Institute, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences), Margaret Maurer-Fazio (Department of Economics, Bates College), Xin Meng (Research School 
of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australia National University), and Hansheng Wang (Department of 
Sociology, Peking University). 
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half the firms had both migrant and laid-off workers. About one third of the firms had 
laid-off workers but no migrant employees. A smaller number of the enterprises 
(approximately 15 percent) had hired migrants and had never laid-off members of their 
urban-resident work force. The remainder of the firms hired only urban residents and had 
no laid-off workers on their rolls. 
Approximately 800 individuals in each of the six cities mentioned above, each 
associated with one of the selected enterprises, were surveyed—4873 individuals in total. 
Once an enterprise was chosen for inclusion in the sample then roughly 15 workers of 
each type (employed urban resident, laid-off urban resident, and migrant) were selected. 
The employed urban residents were randomly chosen from those present at the job site at 
the time of the survey. The laid-off workers were called back to the enterprise to 
participate in the survey. This callback method introduces a potential source of bias into 
the sample—laid-off workers subsequently employed in other locations are most unlikely 
to have responded to the enterprise callback. Migrant workers were surveyed either at the 
job site or in their employer-provided dormitories. In all cases, survey overseers were 
present in the room while respondents completed the surveys. They were thus available to 
observe the process and answer questions. The worker surveys included questions 
regarding background information, work history, income, expenditures, and attitudes.  
It is important to note that the workers designated here as “laid-off” (i.e., labeled as 
xiagang gong ren) are so designated because the enterprises that anchor the surveys 
identified them as such. Almost one third of these “laid-off” workers reported finding 
jobs subsequent to their lay-offs although only one quarter remained employed at the 
time of the survey.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Table 1.  Sample Characteristics 
 
  Migrant      Laid-off      Urban     
   Male  Female      Male  Female     Male  Female 
Number of Observations  1450  71.8% 28.1%    1564  43.46% 56.54   1859 51.7% 48.3% 
Average age  28.46  29.61 25.57    39.20  39.95 38.62   38.24  39.32 36.98 
% Married  51.2  56.7 37.2   83.51  78.78 87.12   83.8  82 85.8 
% Party members  4.9  5.9 2.2   2.26  3.86 1.03   12.2  13.1 5.7 
                   
Education Background                  
Years of schooling  9.04  8.98 9.18   10.57  10.42 10.68   11.69  11.58 11.82 
% No formal education  1.2  1.4 0.7   0.19  0.30 0.11   0.1  0.1 0 
% Junior primary  1.1  1.3 0.7   0.32  0.45 0.23   0  0 0 
% Primary graduate  8.3  8.9 6.9   2.78  3.42 2.29   1.2  1.9 0.6 
% Junior middle school graduate  59.8  58.6 63.1   35.08  40.48 30.81   22.8  26.3 18.9 
% Technical and specialized high 
school graduate  9.6  8.8 11.8    9.43  10.42 8.71   8.4  8.7 8.2 
% Senior middle school graduate  14.3  15.1 12.3   31.20  23.51 37.11   26 22.7 29.2 
% Vocational high school graduate  4.4  4.8 2.9   9.04  9.38 8.82   12.9  11.8 14.3 
% Vocational college graduate  1  0.8 1.5   9.04  8.18 9.74   20.2  18.9 21.7 
%  University graduate  0.3  0.4 0    2.84  3.72 2.18   8.1  9.4 6.9 
%  Post-graduate graduate  0  0 0    0.06  0.15 0   0.2  0.1 0.2 
                   
Work History and Current Job                  
Years of workiexperience  10.38  11.41 7.79   20.01  20.84 19.39   19.18  20.31 17.88 
Years in agriculture   4.48  4.97 3.11    n/a  n/a n/a   n/a  n/a n/a 
No. of times changed danwei  1.58  1.76 1.09    n/a  n/a n/a   0.78  0.81 0.75 
Current/Latest Job Classification                   
% Cadre  1.6  1.7 1.5    n/a  n/a n/a   n/a  n/a n/a 
% Permanent  2.9  2.7 3.5    70.53  69.51 71.22   58.4  59.9 56.6 
% Contract  33.3  32 36.5   28.63  30.19 27.52   39.7  38.7 40.9 
% Temporary  61.1  62.3 58.3    0.58  0.30 1.03   1.5  1.1 2.1 
% Part-time  0.3  0.4 0.2    n/a  n/a n/a   n/a  n/a n/a 
                   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Table 1 Continued  Migrant Male Female  Laid-off Male Female   Urban Male Female 
Current position                   
%. Upper-level cadre  0.1  0 0.3   0.32  0.75    1.7  2.1 1.4 
% Middle-level cadre  0.6  0.8 0.3   3.36  4.92 2.17   12.5  17 7.7 
% Clerical/Office staff  3.3  3.3 3.3    14.60  9.84 18.31   28.1  22.2 34.5 
% Engineer/Technician  6.9  8.8 2    5.88  8.64 2.17   9.2  10.9 7.5 
%  Production line worker   66.1  59.9 81.8   65.76  68.26 63.73   40.9  40.7 40.8 
% Service worker   12.2  13.5 8.8   6.59  4.17 8.47   3.9  3.7 4.1 
%  Sales staff  0.3  0.4 0    2.39  2.53 2.29   1.6  1.7 1.5 
Ownership of current/latest firm                   
% State   77.9  83.8 63.5   81.33  85.74 78.00   80.9  85 76.4 
% Collective   12.1  12.4 11.4   10.54  7.06 13.13   11.7  9.3 14.3 
% Joint venture  7.1  3 17.3    1.37  1.65 1.15   1.6  1.7 1.6 
% Foreign invested  0  0 0    n/a  n/a n/a   0.1  0.1 5.1 
% Joint stock  0  0 0    4.81  4.05 5.41   3.9  2.8 2 
%  Private  2.8  0.8 7.9   0.65  0.30 0.92   1.3  0.7 0.3 
% Individual  0  0 0    0.46  0.45 0.46   0.2  0.1 0.3 
Tenure/Training at c/l firm                   
Tenure at current/latest firm (years)  4.16  4.36 2.12   15.91  16.78 15.25   15.55  16.31 14.67 
% Received training at c/l firm.   55.2  53.3 60.1   48.57  50.31 47.02   65.3  67.5 62.8 
Income and Welfare                   
Monthly income (current job for 
migrants & urban workers & last job 
before layoff  for laid-off workers).  558.97  598.35 457.05   412.36  425.85 402.37   552.68  575.77 528.25 
Days worked per week   5.98  6.09 5.71    5.45  5.48 5.44   5.32  5.39 5.26 
Hours worked per day  8.96  9.1 8.62    7.99  8.03 7.96   8.13  8.24 8.01 
Payment Method                   
% Paid on piece rate  36.3  26.7 60.8    7.67  7.21 7.94   9.1  9.5 8.9 
% Paid on hourly rate  22.6  26.2 13.5    4.78  4.60 4.93   10  8.3 11.5 
% Paid on fixed wage  36.2  41.4 22.9   85.80  86.66 85.20   77.4  78 77 
Benefits                   
% Firms provide medical insurance  20.3  23.5 12.1   53.77  59.00 49.77   50.3  53.5 47.1 
% Firms provide pension   14.1  14.5 13.1   76.15  78.61 74.37   87.9  88.8 87.1 
% Firms provide unemploy. ins.  7.8  8.8 5.2    37.79  41.00 35.37   59 59.1 44.4 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Sample Characteristics 
  Selected sample means and proportions from the worker surveys are reported in 
Table 1 which reveals marked gender differences in the sample composition--men make 
up 52 of our sample of employed urban residents and 72 percent of migrants but only 44 
percent of laid-off urban workers. The laid off-workers, at a mean age of 39, are on 
average a year older than their employed urban counterparts and 11 years older than 
migrant workers who are 38 and 28 years of age, respectively. Urban residents stay in 
school longer than migrants—employed residents have a mean of 11.7 years of schooling 
(laid-off urban residents have a mean of 10.6 years of schooling) in comparison to the 
migrants' mean of 9 years. Over 8 percent of the urban workers and 2.8 percent of the 
laid-off workers have university educations while this level of educational attainment is 
almost non-existent amongst the migrants. Although the majority of workers received 
some job training, the proportion of employed urban residents receiving such training 
was 10 percentage points greater than the proportion of migrants and almost 17 
percentage points higher than those urban residents who were laid-off. 
The monthly income reported in Table 1 includes wages, subsidies, and bonuses 
but does not include the value of employer-provided benefits such as medical insurance, 
pension accruals, and housing. It is interesting to note that the pecuniary income of the 
migrants (559 yuan/month) slightly exceeds that of the urban workers (553 yuan/month) 
and considerably exceeds the pre-layoff income of the laid-off workers (412 yuan/ 
month). The high monthly income of the migrants is due in large part to hours worked by 
male migrants who tend to work 9 hours a day and 6 days a week. The income of the 
laid-off workers reported in Table 1 refers to their average monthly income in the last job William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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before layoff. It has been adjusted to 1999 equivalents by means of an urban consumer 
price index (Zhongguo tongji nianjian, p.290). Over one third of the laid-off workers 
(37.7 percent) managed to find some type of work after being laid off and 27.4 percent 
reported still having a job at the time of the survey. The average monthly income 
declared by these re-employed workers at 571 yuan/month exceeds that of their 
continuously-employed urban counterparts. However, they work more hours per day 
(8.46) and more days per week (5.68) than urban workers who have never experienced a 
layoff (but less hours per week than migrants). Consequently, their hourly wage at 2.58 
yuan is higher than that received by migrants (2.44 yuan/hour) and lower than that 
received by their urban counterparts (2.93 yuan/hour). 
In this sample, approximately 80 percent of the urban residents (both the 
employed and the laid off) work (or used to work) for state-owned enterprises. This 
proportion exceeds the national proportion of urban workers employed in state-owned 
enterprises by 9% (Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian, p.14) and is an artifact of the 
sampling procedure that was aimed in part towards surveying large numbers of laid-off 
urban workers. Fully 78 percent of the migrants work at state-owned enterprises with a 
further 12 percent employed by collectively-owned enterprises. These migrants are quite 
settled—average tenure at their current enterprise exceeds 4 years even though the lion's 
share of migrants, 61 percent, were classified as "temporary" workers. In contrast, 57 
percent of employed urban workers and (ironically) 71 percent laid-off urban residents 
were considered "permanent" workers. 
Far fewer of the laid-off workers than the continuously employed report their 
latest job to be one from the higher rungs of the occupational scale—cadres, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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office/clerical workers, and engineers and technicians. The opposite is true for jobs at the 
lower rungs—higher proportions of the laid-off workers than those never laid off used to 
be production line workers, service workers, and sales workers. Interestingly, the 
proportions of migrants and laid-off urban workers reporting themselves as production 
line workers (66 percent) are equal. Migrants are reputed to take the jobs that urban 
residents disdain but in this sample, which contains many enterprises that both hire 
migrants and lay-off urban residents, we see that migrants have similar occupations to 
those being laid-off.  
There is a great deal of difference in the method by which workers are paid. 36 
percent of migrants were on piece rate, 23 percent were paid by the hour, and 36 percent 
had fixed wages. Over 77 percent of employed urban workers received fixed wages, 9 
percent were on piece rate and approximately 10 percent were paid on an hourly basis. At 
their latest job before being laid off, 86 percent of laid-off workers received fixed wages, 
8 percent were paid by piece rate and 5 percent were compensated on an hourly basis. 86 
percent of employed urban workers received pension benefits while only 14 percent of 
migrants did. Medical insurance was provided by employers to 49 percent of urban 
workers. Only 20 percent of migrant workers received this benefit. (58 percent of the 
laid-off workers used to receive medical insurance.) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Table 2:    A Comparison of the Pre- and Post- Lay Off Incomes and Working Conditions for Re-Employed Workers   
                
Pre-Lay Off Situation         Re-Employment  Situation     
  All Male  Female     All  Male Female
Income and Hours of Work               
Monthly Income  438.36 456.93 427.98  Monthly Income  571.04 627.13 535.16
Hours worked/day  7.96 8.01 7.93  Hours worked/day  8.46 8.80 8.23
Days worked/week  5.45 5.45 5.47  Days worked/week  5.68 5.87 5.57
                
Payment Method               
% Paid by piece rate  9.42 8.12 9.97  % Paid by piece rate  25.58 17.19 30.99
% Paid an hourly rate  7.41 5.58 8.64  % Paid an hourly rate  14.68 12.50 16.20
% Paid fixed salary  80.76 83.25 79.40  % Paid fixed salary  46.54 47.40 46.13
% Other  2.40 3.05 1.99  % Other  13.21 22.92 6.69
                
Occupation               
Upper-level cadre  0.19 0.49    n/a  n/a n/a n/a
Middle-level cadre  3.85 5.91 2.54 manager  13.96 14.77 13.52
office staff  14.45 11.33 16.51  office staff  5.84 4.70 6.56
engineers and technicians  5.97 9.36 3.81  n/a  n/a n/a n/a
production worker  66.09 65.52 66.35 ordinary  worker  50.51 47.65 52.05
service worker  5.59 3.94 6.66  service worker  13.71 10.07 15.98
salesperson 2.89 2.46 3.18  sales worker  6.09 6.04 6.15
self employed   n/a n/a n/a  self employed  6.85 13.42 2.87
other 0.96 0.99 0.95  other  3.05 3.36 2.87
                
Benefits Provided               
% Firms provide medical ins.  62.99 70.62 58.16  % Firms provide medical ins.  31.95 29.79 33.45
% Firms provide pension  83.82 86.77 82.19  % Firms provide pension  44.23 38.80 47.89
% Firms provide unemploy. ins.  39.96 44.57 37.05  % Firms provide unemploy. ins.  26.98 25.00 28.23
                William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Table 2 (Cont.):   A Comparison of the Pre- and Post- Lay Off Incomes and Working Conditions for Re-Employed Workers 
               
Pre-Lay Off Situation         Re-Employment  Situation     
  All Male  Female     All  Male  Female
Ownership Structure of Employer              
% state  77.22 84.65 72.70  % state  37.37 34.90 39.02
% collective  12.36 7.43 15.24  % collective  5.56 6.04 5.28
% joint-venture  1.74 1.98 1.59  % joint-venture  5.81 6.04 5.69
% foreign owned   n/a n/a n/a  % foreign owned  1.52 2.01 1.22
% joint-stock  4.25 2.48 5.40  % joint-stock  8.33 6.71 9.35
% private  1.54 0.50 2.22  % private  15.91 9.40 19.92
% individual  0.97 1.49 0.63  % individual  20.20 26.17 16.26
% other  1.93 1.49 2.22  % other  4.04 7.38 2.03
% don't know   n/a n/a n/a  % don't know  1.26 1.34 1.22
          n/a     This category not included in a particular group’s questionnaire.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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A Comparison of the Pre- and Post-Lay Off Experiences of Re-
Employed Workers 
 
  As described above, slightly over one third of the laid-off workers in our sample 
had found some form of employment by the time of the survey and approximately one 
quarter of the laid-off workers reported still having a job. This group of re-employed 
workers is of particular interest as it allows comparisons of the workers’ pre- and post-
layoff work experiences.  
  Table 2 reveals these re-employed workers are earning more in their new 
positions than they did in the last job before being laid off. (Recall that the pre-layoff 
incomes have been adjusted to 1999 yuan.) They work longer days and more days per 
week for their post-layoff employers. The increase in work hours is more pronounced for 
men than for women. The percentage of workers being paid fixed salaries instead of 
hourly or piece rates has dropped quite dramatically from over 80 percent to 47 percent. 
The fraction of workers being paid on a piece-rate basis almost tripled.  
  Unfortunately, the survey instrument failed to offer identical choices when 
eliciting information about occupational classification in the pre- and post-lay off 
situations. It appears, however, from the information summarized in Table 2 that some 
workers have moved out of production and office staff positions and into sales and 
service positions. Interestingly, some workers seem to have moved up the occupational 
ladder—the percentage of managers in the post-layoff column of Table 2 exceed the 
combined percentages of cadres and engineers/technicians in the pre-layoff column. As 
might be expected, there has been a pronounced drop in the provision of benefits. The William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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percentage of workers receiving medical insurance and pensions from their firms has 
been cut in half. 
  The ownership structure of employers is decidedly different in the pre- and post-
layoff worlds. In the past, over 77 percent of these re-employed workers were employed 
by state-owned enterprises, that percentage has fallen to only 37 percent in their new 
positions. Many of these laid-off workers are now either working in private firms (16 
percent) or are self-employed (getihu) (20 percent). 
Empirical Analysis 
 
Returns to Education 
  China's pre-reform labor system was the antithesis of a free market. The state 
claimed ownership of labor services and bureaucratically assigned workers to enterprises 
for life. Workers’ preferences concerning occupation or location mattered little. On the 
enterprise side, managers for the most part had to accept any and all workers allocated to 
them. Pay rates were nearly equal regardless of worker effort, productivity, or 
performance. This system was incompatible with the economic reform program. 
Manager’s demands for a more flexible and efficient labor system were often 
initially resisted and then introduced only little by little. Yet even these initial, tentative 
steps toward market rationalization rapidly yielded profound changes in China’s labor 
system. Workers gained a great deal of freedom to choose where and for whom they 
would work. A vibrant private sector emerged in which managers had the right to 
determine the size and composition of their work force. There was a strong movement 
towards decentralized, productivity-determined remuneration. Wage variation across William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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workers and sectors increased relative to the pre-reform period (Maurer-Fazio et al. 
1999). Chinese workers experienced considerable change in their work environment. 
Given the incursion of market forces into the urban Chinese workplace by the late 
1990s, it seems likely that we would observe market-influences on returns to investments 
in schooling. To the extent that the work place exhibits features of both the legacy of its 
pre-reform assignment and reward system and the post-reform market system, it is 
possible that the returns to education vary according to the degree of marketization. We 
thus hypothesize that the returns to education will be higher for the labor market 
participants who have obviously found their jobs in the reform period—the re-employed 
workers. We also hypothesize that workers who find their jobs through a competitive 
market means (as opposed to those who obtained their jobs through a non-market, 
uncompetitive mechanism) will have greater rewards to their human capital in general, 
and to their schooling in particular.  
The methodology employed here involves estimating earnings functions of the 
basic form originated by Mincer (1974). The dependent variable in the underlying 
regressions is the natural log of hourly earnings, which include wages, subsidies, and 
bonuses but do not take into account employer-provided benefits such as medical 
insurance, pension accruals, or housing. The independent variables include years of 
schooling, years of work experience, party membership, marital status, city of residence, 
enterprise ownership sector, health status, payment method, and gender. The return to 
education is calculated and expressed in percentage terms by taking the coefficient on 
years of schooling from the Mincerian earnings function and multiplying it by 100. 
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Table 3--Rates of Return to Years of Formal Schooling in Urban Chinese Labor Markets 1999-2000 
    
    
Type of Worker  Returns* Significance No.of Obs. 
    
Employed Urban Residents      
All Urban Workers  3.70  0.000  1546 
Urban Males  4.50  0.000  795 
Urban Females  2.60  0.000  751 
Urban Workers > 12 years of schooling  3.80  0.032  529 
Urban Workers <= 12 years of schooling  3.60  0.000  1017 
Urban Workers--competitively found jobs  5.50  0.000  452 
Urban Workers assigned jobs   3.10  0.000  1088 
    
Migrant Workers      
All Migrant Workers  1.50  0.040  1101 
Migrant Males  1.00  0.256  783 
Migrant Females  4.90  0.000  318 
Migrant Workers > 9 years of schooling  6.40  0.004  351 
Migrant Workers <= 9 years of schooling  1.00  0.182  750 
Migrant Workers--competitively found jobs  2.10  0.118  261 
Migrant Workers introduced to their jobs   1.20  0.172  816 
    
Laid-off Urban Residents (based on pre-layoff income)    
All laid-off  3.00  0.000  918 
Laid-off males  3.70  0.000  377 
Laid-off females  2.80  0.005  540 
Laid-off >12 years of schooling  7.99  0.064  126 
Laid-off <=12 years of schooling  2.40  0.010  792 
Laid-off -- competitively found jobs  1.10  0.352  276 
Laid-off -- introduced to jobs  3.90  0.000  615 
    
Re-employed urban residents (laid-off workers with new jobs, based on current job income) 
All Re-emplyed Workers  4.60  0.001  338 
Re-employed Males  7.10  0.001  129 
Re-employed Females  3.40  0.082  209 
Re-employed Workers > 12 years of schooling  1.90  0.747  55 
Re-employed Workers <= 12 years of schooling 3.10  0.135  283 
Re-employed Workers--competitively found jobs 11.70  0.024  70 
Re-employed Workers introduced to their jobs  4.60  0.003  258 
    
 Re-employed urban residents (based on pre-layoff income)    
All Re-emplyed Workers  2.80  0.018  270 
Re-employed Males  4.56  0.029  104 
Re-employed Females  2.17  0.147  166 
Re-employed Workers > 12 years of schooling  4.63  0.427  42 
Re-employed Workers <= 12 years of schooling 3.91  0.022  228 
Re-employed Workers--competitively found jobs 4.96  0.384  117 
Re-employed Workers introduced to their jobs  3.20  0.010  238 
    
    
    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
  19
Table 3   Continued 
    
      
Type of Worker  Returns* Significance No.of Obs. 
      
Laid-off Workers still without jobs (based on pre-layoff income)   
All non-rehired   2.70  0.003  556 
Non-rehired males  2.77  0.025  244 
Non-rehired females  2.80  0.035  311 
Non-rehired >12 years of schooling  3.90  0.458  77 
Non-rehired <=12 years of schooling  1.10  0.365  479 
Non-rehired --competitively found jobs  0.20  0.868  159 
Non-rehired -- introduced to jobs  3.80  0.001  379 
    
    
Data Source:  China Labor Market Integration Project     
    
*Returns to schooling here are expressed as percentages which are calculated as the coefficients on years 
of schooling in the Mincerian earnings functions multiplied by 100. 
   
   
Note: The dependent variable in the underlying regressions is the natural log of hourly earnings which 
include wages, subsidies, and bonuses but do not take into account employer-provided benefits such as 
medical insurance, pension accruals, or housing. The independent variables include years of schooling, 
years of work experience, party membership, marital status, city of residence, enterprise ownership sector, 
health status, payment method and gender. 
 
Results 
  Table 3 reports the returns to schooling for well-defined sets of workers in 
China’s urban labor markets. The first panel of results reports returns to education for the 
continuously-employed urban residents in our sample (that is, those not laid off by the 
firms that anchor the surveys). This set of workers is then divided first by gender, then by 
education level (high vs. low), and finally by whether the workers used a clearly 
competitive method to find their jobs as opposed to being either assigned to their position 
or being introduced by family members. 
  The coefficients on years of schooling in the underlying regressions were 
statistically significant for each of the groups in this first set. As revealed in Table 3 the 
returns vary from a low of 2.6 percent for the never laid-off females to a high of 5.5 
percent to those who report using competitive methods to find their jobs. The returns for William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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the group as a whole were 3.7 percent. This overall rate of return appears low, and given 
the nature of this sample with its relatively high proportion of state-sector employees and 
over sampling of firms engaged in layoffs, this result is not altogether surprising. 
However, we still see an increase in the returns to education relative to the pre-reform 
period. In our sample urban males received an increase in income of 4.5 percent for each 
incremental year of schooling. We can compare this to a rate of return of 2.5 percent for 
men in the state sector reported by Meng and Kidd (1997). Since industrial reform did not 
significantly influence urban enterprises until 1984, their estimates for 1981 can be 
considered as yielding returns to education in the pre-reform era. 
  The second panel of results in Table 3 reports the returns to education for migrant 
workers, which differ considerably from those of the continuously-employed urban 
workers. The returns to schooling for migrants, as a whole, is very low—1.5 percent. 
Only two of the sub-groups of migrants have rates of return to schooling that are 
statistically significant--both are interesting. First, women migrants have a return of 4.9 
percent (while men’s returns are not statistically different from zero.). And second, 
migrants with more than the mean 9 years of schooling have a very high rate of return to 
schooling—6.4 percent.  
  The third panel of Table 3 reports the returns to education received by the laid-off 
workers in their last job before being laid off. The coefficients on years of schooling in 
the underlying regressions were statistically significant for all but one of the sub-groups 
in this panel—those who found their jobs through a competitive mechanism. The returns, 
in general, are somewhat lower for this group of workers than for the continuously-
employed urban workers. The exceptions are interesting—the group of workers with William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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higher-than-typical educations, those with more than 12 years of schooling, found their 
human capital well rewarded. Each additional year of schooling increased their income 
by 8 percent. The laid-off workers have an average of 20 years work experience and 
many were considered permanent (as opposed to contract) workers. These facts imply 
that many of the laid-off workers were hired by their enterprises in the pre-reform era. It 
is thus not surprising then that the returns to education are higher for those assigned to 
their jobs (3.9 percent) than for those who found their job by a competitive means (not 
significantly different from 0). In the pre-reform period it was the norm for students to be 
assigned to their jobs by the government or by labor bureaus. Job searches were frowned 
upon—students waited to be assigned jobs. State-sector employees requesting a transfer 
were viewed with suspicion as being either incompetent or having interpersonal problems  
  The fourth panel of Table 3 deals with a subset of the laid-off workers—those 
who managed to find new jobs after being laid off. The rewards to human capital 
accumulation are greater for this group of urban workers (in arguably the most 
competitive sphere of China’s labor system) than for those never laid off. The return to a 
year of schooling for the group, based on the income at the new job, is 4.6 percent with 
male rehired workers realizing a return of 7.1 percent and women 3.4 percent. Those who 
reported using a clearly competitive method of finding work have a remarkable return of 
11.6 percent to an additional year of schooling. The fifth panel is similar to the third in 
that it considers the returns to education for laid-off workers in their last job before being 
laid-off but is drawn from a restricted subset—those re-employed at the time of the 
survey. This comparison allows us to avoid the issues of unobserved ability and 
productive characteristics—we are using the same individuals with the same observed William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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and unobserved characteristics. Comparison of the fourth and fifth panels suggests that 
education and human capital is better rewarded in the more competitive sectors of 
China’s current urban economy than it was in the past. This result accords with that of 
Liu, Meng, and Zhang (2000) who find that the increasing marketization of the Chinese 
economy increases competition and drives employers to reward productivity-related 
characteristics more than before. 
  The final panel of Table 3 reports returns of education for the other sub-set of the 
laid-off workers—those who remain unemployed. Comparing these results to those based 
on the pre-layoff income of those who found new jobs we can see that the overall rate of 
return to education is quite similar for the two subsets of laid-off workers. The significant 
difference here is gender related. The men who were re-hired had higher rates of return to 
education in their pre-layoff jobs than those who have not secured subsequent 
employment—the opposite is true for the women. The women who haven’t found 
subsequent employment had a higher rate of return to education than those who have 
found new jobs.  
Table 4:  Oaxaca/Blinder Decomposition of Total Wage Differentials and Education’s 
Contribution to the Wage Gaps 








Average hourly wage 2.438 2.237  2.576
Wage ratio (~/urban) 83.29% 76.43%  88.01%
 
Total Wage Differential 
(yuan/hour, in absolute value) 0.4899 0.6897  0.3503
% Explained 75.11 39.74  -8.48
% Unexplained 24.88 60.25  108.48
 
Contribution of education to total wage gap  
% Due to differences in endowments 52.15 15.72  27.69William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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Table 4   Continued   









Average hourly wage 2.927 2.237  2.576
Wage ratio (~/migrant) 120.06 91.76%  105.66%
 
Total Wage Differential 
(yuan/hour, in absolute value) 0.4889 0.201 0.1386
% Explained 5.89 23.06  90.56
% Unexplained 94.11 76.94  9.44
 
Contribution of education to total wage gap  
% Due to differences in endowments 17.21 -20.38  35.81
Note: The hourly wage rate used in the underlying regressions for laid-off workers is 
calculated from laid-off workers’ reported monthly income from last job before lay-off 
(adjusted to 1999 yuan by an urban consumer price index). The hourly wage rate for all 
other groups is calculated from reported monthly income at current job. 
 
Wage Differentials 
  We use the well-known procedure developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) to analyze the composition of the wage gaps between the various groups in 
China’s urban labor markets. This procedure splits the total wage differential into two 
components: that part of the differential attributable to differences in observable 
productive characteristics (e.g., education), and the residual gap attributable to 
differences in the returns to these productive characteristics. This residual, or 
unexplained, component of the wage gap is generally attributed to discrimination, but 
could be also due to differences in unobserved productive characteristics. 
  Table 4 reports the results of the Oaxaca/Blinder decompositions. The top panel 
refers to the earnings differentials between the employed urban workers and migrants, 
laid-off urban workers, and re-employed workers, respectively. The second panel refers William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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to the earnings differentials between migrant workers and the urban, laid-off, and re-
employed workers, respectively. 
When we use urban workers as the basis of comparison, that is, when we value 
the endowments of the groups according to the urban workers’ reward structure, we see 
that differences in productive characteristics between migrants and urban workers 
accounts for 75 percent of their pay differences. We also see in particular, that differences 
in educational attainment account for 52 percent of the total wage gap. In contrast, only 
40 percent of the wage gap between urban workers and laid-off urban residents can be 
explained by differences in productive characteristics—60 percent remains unexplained. 
Of course, a part of this differential may be caused by a downward bias in the laid-off 
workers recall of their monthly income before being laid off. When we compare the 
current incomes of urban workers with those of the laid-off but subsequently re-employed 
we see that the entire wage gap (and then some) remains unexplained by differences in 
observed characteristics. Re-employed workers are receiving very different treatment 
than continuously-employed urban workers. The contribution of differences in 
educational endowments to explaining the total wage gap between urban residents and 
laid-off workers and re-employed workers is 16 and 28 percent, respectively. 
Looking at the second panel of Table 4, that is, using migrant workers as the base 
of the comparisons and valuing the endowments of the other groups according to the 
migrant workers’ reward structure we see that the lion’s share of the earnings differential 
between migrants and urban residents (94 percent) remains unexplained by differences in 
productive characteristics. This result is not surprising given that the work and 
remuneration conditions that migrants face and their disadvantaged position vis-à-vis William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
  25
those with urban-hukou status. Even though migrants may be making rational economic 
decisions in migrating to urban areas, that is, they may have increased their income and 
well being relative to their pre-migration situation
3 they are paid a wage far below their 
marginal product (Dinh 2002, Meng 2002, Knight, Song, & Jia 1999).
4  When we 
compare the earnings differentials between the migrants and the laid-off workers we see 
that 77 percent of the gap remains unexplained and that education’s contribution to the 
explained portion is negative.  
The final decomposition, between the migrants and re-hired urban workers, is 
perhaps the most significant. Here we have two groups of workers forced to seek work in 
an environment largely unprotected by the institutional legacy of the past. Here the 
earning gap is small: the re-employed workers earn only 6 percent more than the migrants 
(on an hourly basis) and 91 percent of that difference is explained by differences in 
productive characteristics. Differences in educational endowments account for 36 percent 
of the total earnings differential. 
Conclusion 
Our empirical results demonstrate that hukou status continues to influence labor 
market earnings: the human capital of urban residents is better rewarded than that of 
migrant workers. However, urban residents should no longer be considered as just one 
entity. There are clearly reform winners and losers amongst urban residents. Generally 
speaking, workers who found their current employment after being laid-off face a much 
                                                 
3 The migrants in this sample report much higher degrees of job satisfaction than their employed urban 
counterparts. 
 
4  Dinh (2002) and Meng (2002) both examine the relative productivity of urban and migrant workers in 
this data set and report that migrants are paid a fraction of  their marginal product while urban workers are 
paid more than their marginal product. Knight, Song, and Jia report a similar result based on a 1995 
enterprise-based sample of migrants. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 508 
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more competitive environment than they did in the past. It is significant that the human 
capital accumulation of this group of workers is better rewarded, in terms of incremental 
earnings for each additional year of schooling, than that of continuously-employed urban 
workers. Interestingly, the education of the group of re-employed workers is also better 
rewarded in these workers’ post-layoff jobs than it was in their pre-layoff jobs.  
An interesting hierarchy of returns to education has developed. The education of 
migrants is poorly rewarded in general, although, admittedly, both women migrants and 
migrants with more than middle-school educations have high returns. The continuously-
employed urban residents fill the next rank with moderate returns to education. Re-
employed urban residents experience the highest rewards to their education, especially 
those who used a competitive means to find their post-layoff employment.  
When we assess the earning differentials between groups using the continuously-
employed urban residents as the basis of comparison we can explain 75 percent of the 
earnings gap for migrants, 40 percent of gap for laid-off workers, and –8 percent of the 
earnings gap for the re-employed workers in terms of differences in productive 
characteristics. When we use the reward structure of migrants as the basis of comparison 
we can explain from as little as 6 percent of the earnings differentials between migrants 
and urban residents to as much as 91 percent of the difference in earnings between 
migrants and the re-employed urban workers. Educational attainment remains an 
important explanator of earnings differentials between institutionally-differentiated 
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